Making a Difference : Knowledge Activism and Worker Representation in Joint OHS Committees by Hall, Alan et al.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Making a Difference: Knowledge Activism and Worker Representation in Joint OHS
Committees"
 
Alan Hall, Anne Forrest, Alan Sears et Niki Carlan
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 61, n° 3, 2006, p. 408-436.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/014184ar
DOI: 10.7202/014184ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 9 février 2017 02:23
408 © RI/IR, 2006, vol. 61, no 3 — ISSN 0034-379X
Making a Difference
Knowledge Activism and Worker Representation in 
Joint OHS Committees
ALAN HALL
ANNE FORREST
ALAN SEARS
NIKI CARLAN1
This article elaborates the concept of knowledge activism as 
a way of understanding effective health and safety representation 
within the current Ontario legal regime of internal responsibility. 
Based on interviews with unionized health and safety representa-
tives in the auto industry, we suggest that knowledge activism is a 
form of political activism by worker health and safety representa-
tives that is organized around the strategic collection and tactical 
use of technical, scientific and legal knowledge. We argue that 
knowledge activism is more effective with reference to larger scale 
changes in work processes, workplace organization and technolo-
gies, and with reference to occupational health issues. Knowledge 
activism is conceptualized as an effective adaptation to a legislative 
regime which involves worker representatives in decisions without 
providing substantive power or proactive enforcement support.
A key feature of health and safety legislation in many countries is the 
requirement for worker representation and joint labour-management health 
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and safety committees. This has led to an increasing research interest in 
understanding the effectiveness of worker participation in health and safety 
decision-making (for research summaries, see Shearn, 2004; Milgate, Innes 
and O’Loughlin, 2002; Eaton and Nocerino, 2000; O’Grady, 2000; Walters, 
1996a, 1996b). The results of this research point to a variety of structural 
determinants that promote the ability of worker representatives and joint 
committees to improve workplace conditions including unions, legislated 
support for joint health and safety committees, workplace standards, and 
active workplace inspectorates. Yet, for many analysts, it is precisely these 
commonly identified supports for worker activism that can no longer be 
relied upon. Declining union density, inadequate legislative standards, 
limited worker training, and weak enforcement systems have all been 
identified as undermining the effectiveness of worker representatives and 
joint committees in Canada and elsewhere (Haynes, Boxall and Macky, 
2005; O’Grady, 2000; Tucker, 1995; Sass, 1996; Storey and Tucker, 2006; 
Walters, 1985; Walters and Haines, 1988).
Rather than focussing on the constraints, this study directs research 
attention towards the opportunities within the current political-economic 
climate. We agree with those who argue for more active state protection 
of worker rights but recognize that changes of this sort are unlikely in 
the short-run in the context of neo-liberalism and globalization (Quinlan, 
1999). Accordingly, our objective is to identify and investigate situations 
in which worker representatives and joint committees have been able to 
make significant improvements in workplace conditions notwithstanding 
the overarching limitations and constraints. Our goal is to explain why 
and how some worker representatives have been able to make significant 
improvements to working conditions while others have been less 
successful.
The framework for this study is the “production politics” perspective, 
that is, we analyze the strategic use of the political apparatuses of production 
by the parties in the employment relationship (Burawoy, 1985; Russell, 
1999; Walters, 1985). Many researchers have identified the correlates 
of worker representative and joint committee effectiveness but few have 
examined the concrete ways in which changes are achieved within the 
production and joint committee contexts. We do this by analyzing the 
political strategies that unionized worker representatives use to improve 
working conditions, taking into account the power dynamics they face on 
the shop floor. These politics of production include the day-to-day relations 
among worker representatives, managers, and co-workers, the interplay 
between worker representatives’ efforts to improve health and safety 
and collective bargaining generally, the process of hazard identification 
and correction, and worker representatives’ efforts to mobilize legislated 
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occupational health and safety regulations and inspections to support their 
claims for improvement.
Using this approach, we found that some worker representatives were 
more effective than others in gaining substantive changes in working 
conditions. Further analysis revealed that the effectiveness of this group 
of representatives hinged on their autonomous collection and strategic 
use of information, a process we characterize as “knowledge activism.” 
Compared with their less effective counterparts, knowledge activists were 
more likely to: gather their own information, assert workers’ knowledge of 
hazardous conditions, mobilize their co-workers to support their demands 
for improvements, and propose alternative solutions. Although recognizing 
that there are limitations and dangers associated with an activist focus on 
research and scientific discourses (Sass, 1996), we suggest that this can 
be successful when it is underpinned by an understanding of production 
politics as played out in their workplaces. We theorize knowledge activism 
as an adaptive response to the constraining and enabling conditions in 
which worker representatives work for change. In other words, within our 
framework, knowledge activism is best understood as a worker adaptation 
structured by the constraints and the opportunities embedded in the 
current legislative and political economic context. We begin our analysis 
by situating our study within the literature about joint health and safety 
committees.
THE LITERATURE ON WORKER PARTICIPATION IN 
HEALTH AND SAFETY DECISION-MAKING
This study is informed by the academic literature on the effectiveness 
of workers’ participation in occupational health and safety decision-making. 
To date, most of this research has been aimed at identifying the correlates 
of worker representative and joint committee effectiveness. Summarizing 
the results of this research is not a straight-forward task. Reviews of the 
literature invariably note the lack of consensus among researchers (e.g., 
Shearn, 2004; Eaton and Nocerino, 2000). This diversity runs along two 
dimensions: the level of analysis, that is, whether the critical determinants 
of effectiveness are external or internal to the joint committee system, 
and the choice of dependent variables, that is, whether or not “hard” 
measures of effectiveness such as changes in accident rates or the volume 
of compensation claims are essential. As will become evident, this study 
builds on, but does not replicate these approaches.
A central focus of academic investigation has been the production 
context, including the presence of a union, establishment size, characteristics 
of the work force, types of production, the level of mechanization and 
Hall pages 408.indd 410     2006-10-25 08:17:50   
411MAKING A DIFFERENCE
automation, and the attitudes and expertise of management regarding health 
and safety (Eaton, 1994; Frick and Walters, 1998; Hall, 1999; Johnstone, 
Quinlan and Walters, 2005; Lewchuk, Robb and Walters, 1996; Reilly, Paci 
and Holl, 1995; Tuohy and Simard, 1993; Walters, 1996a, 1996b). While the 
overall results on firm characteristics have been inconclusive, a number of 
researchers have pointed to the presence and quality of union representation, 
the knowledge and militancy of front-line workers, the positive management 
attitudes and knowledge, and the level of government enforcement of the 
legislation as factors relevant to joint committee effectiveness or health 
and safety outcomes (Eaton, 1994; Eaton and Voos, 1994; Hall, 1993, 
1999; Kochan, Dyer and Lipsky, 1977; Lewchuk, Robb and Walters, 1996; 
Milgate, Innes and O’Loughlin, 2002; Novek, Yassi and Spiegel, 1991; 
Shannon et al., 1992; Shearn, 2004; Tucker, 1995; Walters, 1996a, 1996b; 
Walters and Haines, 1988).
Researchers have also examined a range of worker representative 
and joint committee characteristics, including such things as committee 
size, committee composition, committee procedures and structures, 
meeting frequency and length, written agendas and minutes, committee 
scope, the participation of upper management, and representative training 
and knowledge (Kochan, Dyer and Lipsky, 1977; Ontario, 1986; Coyle
and Leopold, 1981; Eaton and Nocerino, 2000; Tuohy and Simard, 1993; 
Hall, Forrest and Sears, 2003). The evidence here has also been mixed 
with a number of conflicting findings; however, one of the more consistent 
results has been the positive association between training and committee 
representative knowledge on both injury rates and perceived committee 
effectiveness (Coyle and Leopold, 1981; Eaton and Nocerino, 2000; 
Kochan, Dyer and Lipsky, 1977; O’Grady, 2000; Ontario, 1986; Walters 
and Haines, 1988).
As these latter studies suggest, the impacts of health and safety 
committees on working conditions are often understood, at least implicitly, 
as political outcomes—that is, there is a recognition of a “production 
politics” (Burawoy, 1985) operating within and outside the committee 
context which are critical determinants of change. In Canada, this 
recognition was made very clear in the ground-breaking work of Vivienne 
Walters (1985), who was instrumental in focussing researchers’ attention 
on workplace politics as integral to the health and safety decision-making 
process. Walters (1985) emphasized the need to understand the day-to-day 
production context in which health and safety decision-making is played 
out (see also Walters and Haines, 1988; Walters et al., 1995). She found 
that workers’ capacity to make meaningful improvements in their working 
conditions was limited by the pressures of production, the lack of worker 
control over the work process, workers’ limited access to information, and 
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management’s reliance on cost-related arguments. She pointed, as well, 
to the ideological constraints that limit the power and impact of worker 
representatives and joint committees. Walters argued that joint committees 
often have little effect on managerial decision-making even when managers 
are “cooperative” because worker representatives are drawn into a web of 
technical and collaborative discourses that structure their understanding of 
reasonable risk and realistic cost in ways favourable to management. And 
finally, she identified how medical and other expert discourses can confound 
workers representatives’ capacity to recognize and challenge the presence 
of hazardous conditions.
A number of subsequent Canadian studies adopting the production 
politics perspective stressed the political, legal, and ideological constraints 
on workers and worker representatives (Hall, 1993, 1996, 1999; Tucker, 
1995; Novek, Yassi and Spiegel, 1991; Ontario, 1986; Russell, 1999; Sass, 
1996; Snider, 1991; Storey, 2004; Storey and Tucker, 2006). These critical 
assessments demonstrate how the limitations of Canadian health and safety 
legislation and the enforcement apparatus undermine the effectiveness of 
worker representatives and joint committees. For example, Walters and 
Haines (1988) found that worker representatives and joint committees were 
often ineffective because workers had not been adequately informed about 
their legal rights, which they linked to the failure of the Ontario law to ensure 
worker education. In another examination of the Ontario situation, Tucker 
(1995) suggested that the limited power of joint committees, which are 
advisory under the law, was further undercut by the declining enforcement 
resources dedicated to the Health and Safety Inspectorate, a problem that 
is even more acute in non-union workplaces. In a study of a Nova Scotia 
mine disaster, Glasbeek and Tucker (1999) demonstrate the enormous 
impact of labour market pressures and internal management manipulations 
of those pressures on worker acceptance of hazardous work, while Storey 
and Lewchuk (2000) document in the asbestos case of Bendix in Windsor, 
Ontario, the capacity of management to delay action on identified hazards 
in the face of weak government enforcement.
In this literature, two central conditions are frequently distinguished 
as critical determinants of positive change in health and safety: worker 
knowledge and worker power. This finding recognizes that workers and 
worker representatives can only act to prevent injury or disease if they 
have the capacity to identify and understand the hazards in their workplace. 
However, as Eric Tucker (1995: 255–256) puts it, “having knowledge is 
one thing, acting on it to improve health and safety is another.” In line 
with this, most critical analysts in the Canadian health and safety literature 
have seen knowledge as a precondition for action, while action itself is 
understood as conditional on other aspects of the workers’ power base. This 
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includes access to counter-hegemonic ideologies, the degree of economic 
(in)security, collective support from co-workers or their union, legal rights 
and protections, the enforcement apparatus, and so on (e.g., see Walters, 
1985: 62–63; Storey and Tucker, 2006: 161).
The conceptual distinction between knowledge and the power to act 
on knowledge is derived from the substantial number of detailed case 
studies of health and safety politics which show that even when workers 
have clear knowledge of extremely hazardous conditions, they often accept 
those conditions (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1999; Gray, 2002; Hall, 1999; 
Storey and Lewchuk, 2000). However, it also relates to the argument that 
these same power sources are critical determinants of access to knowledge. 
Tucker (1995: 256) again reminds us that “power may be a precondition 
for the acquisition of knowledge, let alone the use of it,” that is, workers’ 
capacity to demand accurate and understandable hazard-related information 
is a measure of their legal rights and political power. Yet, the finding that 
knowledge does not translate readily into action is further complicated
by the recognition that certain types and sources of knowledge are privileged 
over others, with particular reference to the greater legitimacy accorded to 
scientific and technical authorities over workers’ indigenous knowledge 
(Hall, 1996, 1999; Walters, 1985; Walters et al., 1995; Wilson, 1983). 
In other words, even when workers have experience-based knowledge of 
hazards and seek to use that knowledge to minimize risk, their knowledge 
is generally not accepted as sufficiently authoritative to warrant changes 
in conditions. Indeed, it is precisely this emphasis on expert knowledge 
that prevents workers and worker health and safety representatives from 
achieving what Patrick Wilson (1983) calls “cognitive authority.”
While few, if any, health and safety analysts would deny that knowledge 
can be an important source of power, most studies have emphasized the
absence of knowledge or “legitimate” knowledge (Walters et al., 1995), 
and so, failed to look more closely at how knowledge is actually being 
acquired, legitimized, and used by workers and worker representatives. 
The result is that workers’ capacity to acquire and use information and 
“legitimate” knowledge is understudied. This is significant in as much as 
the current regulatory and political economic circumstances may accentuate 
the significance of knowledge as a critical source of power and as a political 
tool. These are the issues taken up by this study.
THE STUDY
This paper relies on qualitative data collected through open-ended 
interviews with unionized worker health and safety representatives from 
twenty-seven different small to medium-sized (50–500 employees) 
Hall pages 408.indd 413     2006-10-25 08:17:51   
414 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2006, VOL. 61, No 3
Ontario auto parts plants and four larger assembly plants. Most were union
co-chairs of the joint health and safety committee in their workplace and the 
designated certified representatives (as required by Ontario’s Occupational
Health and Safety Act, 1990). All participated in an earlier phase of this 
research in which we surveyed both union plant chairs and health and safety 
chairs about occupational health and safety and the impact of restructuring 
on their workplaces. Auto parts plants were chosen as the primary location 
for this study because occupational health and safety in this sector is under-
investigated in relation to the assembly sector of the industry. Since our 
analysis of the assembly plants also revealed good examples of the different 
forms of representation, we decided to include them in this paper. All plants 
in our sample were represented by various locals of the same union, the 
Canadian Auto Workers, all interviewees had received some formal union 
health and safety training; and most had benefited from the additional 
training provided for designated certified workplace representatives.
The interviews were semi-structured (ranging from 1–2 hours in length 
on average), tape-recorded, and transcribed. A follow-up phone interview 
was also conducted. Participants were asked how they identified health and 
safety issues, what they did to address those issues, and what they were 
able to achieve in terms of change. In asking these questions, we wanted to 
understand the methods, strategies, and tactics that worker representatives 
identified as successful approaches to change. In every case, the interviewer 
probed for information about the various channels through which change 
was achieved, both informal and formal.
Although we had other more traditional measures of committee 
effectiveness using our quantitative survey data, including self-reported 
monthly injury rates and direct assessments of committee impact (Eaton and 
Nocerino, 2000), these measures were not strongly inter-related nor were 
they consistently related to the information about working conditions and 
changes in working conditions in the qualitative data. In particular, it was 
evident that some representatives were reporting high levels of effectiveness 
in the survey while reporting very limited kinds of improvements in their 
qualitative accounts, while others were reporting low to moderate levels 
of success in the survey, yet, described quite substantial gains in their 
qualitative accounts. For these reasons, our categorization focussed on 
the kinds of issues health and safety issues representatives addressed and 
the outcomes of their efforts to improve working conditions. Variations in 
representatives’ accounts were identified along three main dimensions: 1) 
a focus on immediate and visible safety issues vs. greater attention to both 
safety and occupational health issues; 2) a focus on smaller scale issues 
with limited impacts on production or cost vs. larger scale interventions 
differentiated in terms of cost, time required to make the changes, a need 
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for engineering changes, or a redesign of the production process; and 3) 
an emphasis on consequences or surface issues vs. identifying underlying 
causal factors. Interviewees’ views about their degree of success informed 
but did not determine their place in the scale.
FORMS OF WORKER REPRESENTATION: THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF KNOWLEDGE ACTIVISM
Our initial differentiation of strategies, issues, and outcomes revealed 
two broad forms of health and safety representation: technical-legal 
representation (TL) (N = 10) and politically-active representation (PA) 
(N = 21). These were distinguishable by the former group’s reliance on 
established rules and procedures for identifying and correcting hazards 
and the latter group’s willingness to challenge the claims and constraints 
imposed by management. However, within this latter group of politically 
active representatives, we also identified a more effective subgroup whose 
political engagement involved the strategic collection, use and deployment of 
knowledge. These knowledge activists (KA) (N = 11) were characterized by 
their persistent self-training and wide-ranging sources of information, their 
active efforts to legitimate and act on workers’ indigenous knowledge about 
unsafe or unhealthy conditions, the scale and importance of the issues they 
addressed, their focus on underlying causes, and their willingness to present 
managers with solutions. They were also more effective implementers of 
change than either the technical-legal or the politically active representatives 
who did not grasp or mobilize the strategic power of knowledge.
Technical-Legal Representation
The distinction between the technical-legal and politically-active 
representatives became clear fairly quickly in our analysis. Whereas 
politically-active representatives understood to varying degrees, explicitly or 
through their behaviour, that their capacity to achieve improved health and 
safety conditions was a function of power and political influence, technical-
legal representatives talked about their inspections and committee activities 
in very technical and legalistic terms. TLs behaved as if outcomes were 
dictated almost entirely by agreed upon and predictable legal, technical, 
economic, and procedural considerations. For this group, which constituted 
one-third of the representatives interviewed (N = 10), health and safety was 
clearly separated in their minds from “labour relation issues.” Health and 
safety stood apart from other labour-management issues where conflicts of 
interests and a definite politics shaped by institutional power structures were 
understood to be part of the relationship. As one of these TL representatives 
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put it when asked if he wanted to become a plant steward or chair, “no, 
that’s labour relations, it’s a different avenue—health and safety … I guess 
it’s just about people’s safety” (TL1).
The technical-legal group was not distinguishable by the amount of 
training they had received or by their effort—there were many experienced 
and hard-working union representatives among them—but by the limitations 
they were prepared to accept. These representatives saw themselves 
primarily as inspectors who reported hazards as they were discovered 
within the context of their formal responsibilities, with particular reference 
to their formal inspection duties and their role as conduits for worker 
complaints. Problems identified in these ways were then corrected or not 
by management, based on economic, legal, or technical criteria defined and 
decided largely by management.
I. What do you see as important health and safety for you?
R. Saving peoples lives I guess. I watch making sure all of the equipment is 
working properly and all of it is maintained. And that way, it will save on … 
you’ll end up getting less injuries …
I. Can you give me any examples where you went to the company and asked 
them to do something and they did it, versus other situations where they 
didn’t?
R. Well I can say I don’t think there are really any [where they didn’t do what 
was asked] … if it is important … they jump on it right away. (TL3)
Among the technical-legal representatives were many who claimed 
high degrees of effectiveness and very little conflict with management. 
In both the questionnaire and the interview, these informants consistently 
described the correction of basic housekeeping and maintenance issues 
such as oil leaks, broken machinery, failures to wear safety equipment, and 
missing guards as evidence of their success. As a rule, these hazards were 
inexpensive to repair or disrupted the flow of production, so provoked few 
objections from management.
What I do is I highlight all of these issues during our weekly safety audits … 
We present it at the joint health and safety committee meetings at the end of the 
month. So we’re trying to do our part but as a safety committee, you are aware 
we only have a recommendations capability. We don’t have the authority, to say, 
George, you go do this job. That responsibility falls in somebody else’s category. 
So, we certainly bring it to their attention, management’s attention. (TL8)
As the above quote indicates, legal-technical representatives were 
quite conscious of, but did not question, management’s ultimate authority. 
They understood their responsibilities and powers in very legalistic terms 
as if they were dictated strictly by the legislation, and tended to rely on 
management experts without question.
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R. My management counterpart on the joint health and safety committee was 
a person that followed the green book. Our company is a large company, so 
we have all of the resources that generally are needed. We have had people 
come in to do testing of materials; there was some concerns of mold in the 
facility, and we had an outside contractor come in to do it cause we didn’t 
have that expertise. Maybe air sampling for specific things, we would call in 
outside contractors to do, but we have hygienists on staff that generally do 
all of the testing.
I. And the union feels perfectly comfortable in relying on people employed 
by the company?
R. Well, I guess that’s a matter of debate. Sometimes when people don’t hear 
what they want to hear, say that the company is not doing it right. You know, the 
time I was there, I never found the company to try to hide things from me. I was 
always able to be present at the testing. I could ask all the questions. I never found 
them to want to hide anything. But I guess sometimes shop committee people 
look at things differently for political reasons. But, I play by the green book, 
that’s it. If it’s in the green book, I do it. If it’s not in the green book or master 
agreement that I have with the company, then it’s not a safety issue. (TL8)
Politically-Active Representation
The other, larger, group—politically active representatives (PA)—
understood their role and responsibilities quite differently. Although they 
varied widely in the degree of reported conflict and cooperation with 
management, they shared a common understanding that their role was not 
confined to the identification and reporting of hazards within the strict limits 
of the law. Characteristically, they believed that change often required them 
to contest management claims or actions.
The stuff that’s the hardest to get is the stuff that’s grey in the occupational 
health and safety act—a manager would look at you and say that’s a luxury 
… So sometimes you either have to figure out how to force their hand or they 
won’t do it. (PA5)
PAs were prepared to actively press their own claims for change, 
in some cases, by filing a complaint with the ministry of labour and/or 
mobilizing workers to pressure management.
Ventilation is at the top of the list because it’s an ongoing concern—all these 
fumes will cause health problems you get guys with bleeding noses … you 
can get quite serious about this and you just have to act a bit harder on the 
company … I’ve got the Ministry of Labour coming in and issuing orders, 
getting testing done … Every day I’m on the production manager’s mind, I’m 
in his face every day. (PA4)
The significance of their political engagement was important in other 
ways, as well. Politically-active representatives tended to identify larger 
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scale issues as health and safety problems. These problems went beyond the 
routine and included many that contested important aspects of management 
policy or the norms of the production system more generally.
I would say the biggest issue today would be the lack of preventative mainte-
nance of equipment and tooling. That would be the biggest one. Because when 
you downsize all your departments, something has to be impacted by that deci-
sion. … And as a result, some things go unchecked for longer periods of time. 
If you have the resources in place of course, you can have your preventative 
maintenance program a hundred percent and other area a hundred percent. But 
when you cut back, it tends to affect that area. So you kind of, you can, so you 
find yourself in a situation where you’re repairing things as they break down 
or as needed. You’re not looking for problems at that point. (PA7)
Knowledge-Active Representation (KA)
As we further examined the accounts of politically-active representatives, 
we realized that there were important differences in the kinds of knowledge 
they used and the ways they used that knowledge, that is, we began to 
recognize that some representatives were making much more explicit, 
active, and effective use of indigenous, technical, and legal knowledge 
in order to identify hazardous conditions and substantiate their claims for 
improvements (Bryce and Manga, 1985; Walters, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c). 
Representatives who displayed this approach distinguished themselves 
by their active and autonomous pursuit of specialized knowledge and 
information—knowledge they then used to identify hazards, to assess risk, 
and most significantly, to strategically and tactically achieve changes.
R. I had five guys in my plant with chrome holes—bleeding … it’s probably the 
most toxic thing I’ve ever seen. … The company was ignorant to the fact so I 
found [out], I did some investigating throughout the labs ‘cause we have our own 
labs. I investigated and that’s when I went to them I seen the [name of chemical] 
and I knew this was a suppressant, they didn’t want to recognize the situation, 
they said make them [the workers] wear personal protection equipment—that’s 
not going to fix it … I told the company there’s different places in Indiana and 
Kitchener, they don’t have twists on auxiliary anodes, they have snap on …
I. How would you know that?
R. I researched. I research all the time. (KA10)
And, in another case:
R. We now have a procedure we negotiated involving new equipment, we sign 
it off before it gets to the production floor—if they bring in a new press, we 
look at the PSR, we still do not trust the engineer who signed the PSR, we go 
look at the piece of equipment—the equipment [itself] may be safe but if there 
is no ventilation, lighting, anti-fatigue matting or support equipment or if it 
backs into a busy forklift area, the machine may be safe but not the worker.
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I. How did you learn all that stuff?
R. Trial and error. Talking to other people within your local, other plants, 
magazines, internet … I sit on a committee with … at this Local, a health 
and safety committee where you talk to other workers and by networking you 
find somebody who’s done the same thing before … and call the Ministry of 
Labour inspector and ask them for advice. (KA7)
This approach was in contrast to the majority of representatives who 
tended to rely on information provided by management or management 
experts, or on their own personal experience or common sense. This was 
especially evident within the technical-legal group.
I. Let’s talk about coolants in the plant. Any worker comp. claims, any can-
cers?
R. Cancers no … irritations of the skin, things like that, rashes. We have a 
representative from the company [that makes the coolant] and give us a break-
down of everything about the coolant. Give us a full report and that report is 
put out front for everyone to look at.
I. Do you feel any discomfort from the fact that you’re getting all the informa-
tion from the guy who’s selling the product.
R. No, I don’t. (TL4)
In contrast to the technical-legal representatives, politically-active 
representatives who were not knowledge activists were more likely to 
contest management claims and more likely to press for the changes they 
wanted by mobilizing workers or persuading government inspectors. None 
the less, their reliance on personal, indigenous knowledge and common 
sense often limited the range and level of the changes they could achieve. 
Without a knowledge activist orientation, PAs reported more difficulties 
convincing managers, government inspectors, and even workers that the 
problems they identified needed to be addressed.
And I would go to back for any legitimate demand, but in some of them the 
company looked through myself to see how serious is the anxiety. They’ll 
actually ask the workers involved in those areas. If they get feed back that it’s 
just bullshit, it’s just a couple of guys complaining, they won’t move on them. 
The worker involved has to decide what he wants, is this an issue for him or 
is he just uncomfortable with it. (PA3)
Concomitantly, the successes reported by politically-active represent-
atives who were not knowledge activists also tended to be limited along the 
lines similar to the TLs, for example, housekeeping issues such as cleaning 
up spills, cracks in hoists, mechanical problems, or behavioural issues such 
as failure to wear personal protective equipment. Consequently, the changes 
made tended not to alter the work processes or work organization in any 
fundamental way. There was also less emphasis, or at least success, in the 
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area of disease prevention. Prevention initiatives in these workplaces were 
directed at issues such as back injuries or other ergonomic problems in 
response to management’s concern to limit compensation claims.
Every plant has back injuries, I don’t know why but they [management] try 
to stop them but you are always going to get that. Ever since carpal tunnel 
syndrome came in, there’s a lot of people with repetitive injuries and that’s 
why we got the ergonomic committee to work on that. (TL1)
Knowledge activists on the other hand were distinguishable by their 
ability to make significant improvements in workplace conditions, especially 
on relatively large-scale issues. When asked to report on their successes, 
knowledge activists typically provided more examples and the examples 
they offered demonstrated more substantial and more elaborate changes in 
technology, work processes, and work organization. The differences were 
particularly marked in the area of disease prevention. As one KA co-chair 
put it,
Me and the guys [the other union JOHC representatives] … we made them put 
in half a million dollars in ventilation units and a million dollar sprinkler system 
and they’ve upgraded the building to the point where training, ergonomics are 
our main concerns [now]. (KA10)
While the level of the activism varied among the eleven KAs—some 
were collecting information and building their knowledge base almost 
 continuously while others were more situational or issue focussed—all 
shared the view that effective representation required them to seek 
 information autonomously through alternative sources. Most were very 
careful observers of the conditions in their workplaces, and in all the issues 
they raised in the interviews, they went beyond the information provided 
by management or management’s experts.
There were things in the [air assessment] report that were incorrect and I felt 
I needed some help from people that knew what they were talking about more 
so [than me] because, like, I’m still new to that … Chemistry was never my 
best … (KA5)
As this implies, they also recognized the limits of the knowledge they 
gathered through workplace inspections and investigations of workers’ 
concerns. Knowledge activists extended this knowledge by conducting 
their own independent research through web sources, books, and personal 
and professional contacts. The most active of these representatives
saw the collection and gathering of information as a continuous,
on-going responsibility required by their role. They also realized the 
importance of expanding their capacity to understand, interpret, and
analyze the information. Accordingly, many knowledge activists pursued 
advanced training and education whenever possible, often at their own 
expense.
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I drive my wife nuts. You see, I don’t abuse the system and I do a lot of courses 
on weekends and on nights. … I do everything on my own time. I don’t get 
paid for it. (KA9)
Knowledge activists understood the power of their independent 
information and analysis when “making a case” to management. Many 
reported that they were able to achieve significant changes by persuading 
managers in joint committee meetings or in one-to-one interactions 
using their independent research. Persuasion was not their only strategy. 
Depending on the issue, they also relied on direct pressure, if necessary. In 
some workplaces, management wanted only confirmation that there were 
worker complaints; in others, the representatives solicited support from 
workers or the union, or used threats of government inspections. At bottom, 
however, knowledge activists believed managers were more likely to act 
when they were convinced the risk was real and more likely to think the 
risk was real when the hazard was substantiated with documented evidence 
or external expert opinion. The success of these persuasive strategies may 
also reflect different management orientations to health and safety and 
worker participation more generally (Lewchuk, Robb and Walters, 1996), 
and these factors did vary across the workplaces studied; however, the 
representative’s own research and knowledge was frequently an important 
part of the mix.
I mean, you know, everything’s different, but you try to get a result as quickly 
as possible. So if I’m having a problem with it going through there, I mean 
if it’s in the green book or if it’s in our collective agreement, they have to do 
it immediately. But this might be something over and above that the workers 
are asking for, it usually takes a little bit longer. You know, you have to build 
a business case, you know to get, a good example would be, I had a call, I 
was getting a lot of calls on the smoke enclosures for our TSR oven. … The 
company had no obligation to put booths around the enclosures because the 
air samples always proved that the samples were under the Ministry of Labour 
guidelines and the company standard guidelines for air samples. But still, like 
the employees on the first day had been complaining about their eyes burning, 
you know the mucous membranes, having a problem with them. So I asked 
the company if we could build some kind of enclosure around it to trap the 
smoke and exhaust it better … And about two years ago on a summer shut 
down, they started building these booths, and I mean it cost a lot of money, 
but I had to go through the production manager to do it. So that process took 
probably about, from start of the concerns, probably about, almost six months 
before I could get them completed. (KA1)
From our perspective, knowledge activists reported a higher degree 
of effectiveness than other worker representatives in that they were more 
likely to identify significant workplace hazards and more likely to convince 
management (and workers) that particular problems were serious enough 
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to warrant expenditures or major changes in work process, or that changes 
would pay off in terms of productivity, cost savings, or worker satisfaction. 
Often, these initiatives took considerable time to achieve; yet, it was the 
knowledge activists’ commitment to working for these larger longer term 
changes, by developing and researching the case for change that was critical 
to their distinctive range and levels of success.
R. Well, here’s for example. We have a new addition on our plant … So 
there’s a storage area in this new, this new addition. So there’s more fork lift 
truck going along this aisle way now, in the old section, right? Now we have 
a punch press and we have control panels for them. Well the control panel is 
on the aisle side to which these fork trucks drive. Before the addition it wasn’t 
as crowded … So now, we make a recommendation that they move that panel, 
that control panel to the other side away from the aisle. Ok. So that’s our long 
term. Our short term is, is to anchor two poles in the ground, so that way, if 
somebody should ever get too close to that panel, or too close to that person 
working at that panel, they’ll be protected by those, those poles that are, steel 
poles that are cemented in the ground. (KA9)
INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY AS A 
LEGITIMATE KNOWER
An important insight that knowledge activists tended to share was 
the realization that their capacity to convince management depended 
substantially on their standing among managers, workers, other union 
representatives and leaders, and government inspectors. Unlike other 
politically-active representatives, knowledge activists understood that 
their capacity to get things changed required them to be recognized as 
legitimate authoritative “knowers” of health and safety hazards (Walters 
et al., 1995).
If you’re educated enough to know what you’re talking about they don’t talk 
down to you. They know [you’re right] and they’ll do it. (KA4)
For this reason, knowledge activists were particularly conscious of the 
need to ground their complaints in well-documented cases.
Sometimes I have to push them. So that’s a bit of a frustration because I’m big 
on documentation because we need to know what’s going on and where we’re 
going, and looking [for problems], I like to look for trends. (KA10)
Knowledge activists also understood the value of independent expert 
evidence as strengthening and legitimizing their claims. For example, 
a number of activists made frequent effective use of ergonomists and 
hygienists at their local occupational health and safety clinic (OHCOW) to 
address a persistent problem of fumes in the plant, while others frequently 
sought advice from their national union health and safety representatives or 
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through their fellow health and safety representatives at the local committee 
level. Many also understood the value of getting copies of research reports 
and papers, and made good use of library and web sources to substantiate 
their claims when making their case to management.
As this implies, knowledge activists realized that the identification and 
assessment of risk was not just a question of common sense. Knowledge 
activists did not assume, as many other representatives seemed to, that the risk 
involved in any particular activity was self-evident or easily recognized simply 
because he or she had been on the job for a long time or because he or she had 
basic safety training. And, unlike those representatives who rarely questioned 
management’s use of scientific and expert knowledge, knowledge activists 
were more aware of the limitations of scientific and expert knowledge.
I. Have you brought in the Ministry?
R. The Ministry has been in there a couple of times. Both times that they come 
in the air passed allowable...
I. Limits.
R. Limits. However, you know if you work there. You know. When you’re 
blowing your nose and nothing but black comes out, that something is obvi-
ously wrong. (KA10)
There’s a level of labelling since 1989 that’s required by WHMIS but to my 
estimation they are not realistic with the type of chemicals we use … so we 
don’t label them … the operators know the difference. … We had tri-chloroeth-
ylene thrown in a barrel once by accident and what saved us was the operators 
knew the difference between the odours. It was mislabelled. Someone said it 
smells funny and we got it out of there within the hour. (KA7)
Many representatives shared this respect for workers’ indigenous 
knowledge but the KAs also understood that it was often in these situations 
that their own research was critical in locating additional external 
“scientific” support to legitimate what they knew from experience (Walters 
et al, 1995). It is worth noting that the TLs often showed less respect for 
worker knowledge and were more likely to emphasize the role that workers 
played in causing accidents and disease. As one put it:
Like most companies there are procedures. The only thing is getting workers 
to do them. Because there’s always a shortcut and it’s trying to change that 
culture. So we need to have that paradigm shift where they’re going from 
having the knowledge to implementing the knowledge. (TL1)
PRESENTING MANAGEMENT WITH SOLUTIONS
Along with the enhanced authority attached to their knowledge 
acquisition, the relative success of the knowledge activists in gaining 
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more significant improvements in conditions was a function of the tactical 
way in which they used information to make their case. Rather than just 
demonstrating that there were problems that needed to be corrected, 
they frequently did their own research on solutions. When KAs went to 
management with a complaint they often argued for particular solutions 
designed to appeal to management based on cost estimates and/or potential 
output or quality improvements.
I. Can you describe one of your more successful efforts to get a change in 
working conditions?
A. Ventilation was, we got some really good ventilation systems put in. 
 Actually, in our benches we got moveable arm ventilation to work in the 
area, where they used to have just little hood where in order for the smoke to 
get to the hood, it has to cross the workers’ breathing zone. With these arms, 
they come right into the work area right at the level of location and does a 
really good job.
I. How did you do that?
A. Doing my own research and seeing the people first who were complaining. 
I showed them [management] on paper … I went on internet and got pictures 
of what I wanted and showed where the problems are, that the ventilation was 
behind the worker and the smoke goes past you.
I. So you went to management with this?
A. I showed it to the workers first and then we collectively started talking to 
the company and showed them where the changes would be, that the guys will 
be on the job longer without having to go to first aid and report that there’s 
itchy noses and coughing and spitting up black. (KA10)
The committee wrote the recommendation, outlining the physical aspects of 
the job and the problems that we foresee, and then we faced cost against cost 
of someone getting injured on that job. The company agreed that they would 
look at it [lift assist machine] and while they were mulling it over, we went to 
the manufacturers, different companies and looked at having different quotes 
and ideas, brought them in … and we got approval from corporate and they 
put it in across Canada, one for each plant. (KA1)
While the dangers of getting trapped in the logic of cost-benefit analysis 
have been discussed in the health and safety literature (Hall, 1996), most 
of these KA representatives used information about cost strategically. 
They recognized that costs were always an issue and must be dealt with. 
By framing their proposals in the language of management as in making a 
“business case,” they sought to bolster the legitimacy of their petition.
Knowledge activists’ pro-active approach to crafting solutions was 
in sharp contrast with that of other representatives who left the task of 
developing solutions to management. Consequently, when management 
proposed doubtful solutions or refused to make changes judged too 
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expensive, the representatives were unable to challenge those claims. 
As one representative reported when asked about his efforts to deal with 
guarding issues:
Because of cutbacks we have a maintenance department that’s smaller than 
what it used to be. So it’s a resource issue. You know, who’s available to do 
what. So sometimes I have to wait longer on certain issues. And there’s room 
for that, sometimes. (TL2)
Providing solutions to managerial problems was also an important 
dimension of KA representatives’ efforts to build working relationships 
with managers.
I. What, can you give me an example of where something where you have been 
really successful in changing something because of health and safety?
R. Yeah, I threatened a bilateral safety stop of the work.
I. On?
R. Stoppage and they fix it right away.
I. And that’s the way you do it?
R. Well, if that’s what it takes. Whatever it takes to get it done. But I can get 
frustrated or I can work along side with the company. I can make them put in 
temporary solutions, to make it safe for the time being but go for long term 
solutions. You have to be, you have to give some kind of recommendation 
to help them along. You can’t always be pushing them, say look I need this 
fixed, I don’t care how you do it, just do it. You got to be part of the solution. 
(KA9)
Again, this “working with management” might be interpreted to mean 
that the KAs were getting too close to management, and one can certainly 
recognize the dangers here. Indeed, it may be that some KAs become LTs 
over time. A different research design is clearly needed to examine this ques-
tion, but what we can say is that most KAs seemed to be self-consciously 
building their management relationships based on the clear understanding 
that this was a necessary political strategy given the constraints and limita-
tions of their position as worker representatives.
CONCLUSION: KNOWLEDGE ACTIVISM AS A SUCCESSFUL 
ADAPTATION
This study identified three different approaches or models of health 
and safety representation with differing degrees of effectiveness. The 
most effective was knowledge activism, which we describe as a form of 
political activism organized around the collection and use of a wide variety 
of health and safety knowledge. While many of the union health and safety 
representatives interviewed for this study understood their role in political 
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terms (PAs), the distinguishing features of the knowledge activists (KAs) 
were their autonomous collection and strategic application of legal, technical, 
and medical knowledge as political tools. For these representatives, control 
over knowledge was at the core of their activism and the primary reason 
for their greater success. They recognized that, as workers, they needed 
to demonstrate their competence as authoritative “knowers,” which they 
routinely did by identifying and documenting hazards (Wilson, 1983), 
gathering information from medical and scientific sources, and calling on 
independent experts. This was in stark contrast to those representatives 
(TLs) who accepted company and government standards, guidelines, and 
assessments as uncontested.
Yet, what also distinguished the greater and deeper impact of 
knowledge activists over all the other representatives, both the PA and 
TL representatives, was their capacity to contest through persuasion and 
argumentation. While not shying away entirely from more overt political 
tactics such as mobilizing workers to complain or refuse unsafe work, 
or calling in government inspectors, these tools were used sparingly 
and only in conjunction with well argued and supported cases made to 
management within and outside the joint committee context. Management’s 
understanding that these representatives would and could employ political 
pressure if needed, an insight shared by many KAs, may help to explain the 
company’s willingness to listen and act based on persuasion alone. However 
it was clear from the representatives’ accounts that many also saw the legal 
and scientific force of their argument as an integral aspect of their power to 
persuade, even in the face of little worker, union or state support.
These findings are consistent with the research literature on the 
effectiveness of health and safety committees in that they emphasize the 
importance of training, management responsiveness, and communication 
(Walters, 1996c; Lewchuk, Robb and Walters, 1996). At the same time, 
we acknowledge the concerns expressed by some analysts that activists 
who focus their energies around scientific and technical discourses may be 
muted and confined in their agendas and impact (Sass, 1996: 356). In our 
estimation, all forms of institutionalized representation are constrained in 
significant ways, and ultimately in their impact, and occupational health and 
safety is no exception. However, as this study suggests, there is an important 
distinction between those representatives who simply accept a subordinate 
position within this discursive domain (i.e., TLs), those who seek to operate 
outside that discourse (i.e. PAs), and those who seek to exploit the counter-
hegemonic possibilities within this discourse as a conscious political strategy 
(i.e., KAs). We concur with Sass (1996) that health and safety committees are
more effective in achieving larger scale changes when worker representatives 
challenge management rather than simply accept a passive technical role. 
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We also agree that corporate and state influence over scientific and technical 
discourses in occupation health and safety have been and continue to be 
important means for resisting worker and union demands (Castleman and 
Ziem, 1988; Dorman, 2006; Walters, 1985). Nevertheless, our findings 
suggest that we need to go beyond these arguments to recognize not only the 
limitations of joint committee representation and knowledge based discourses 
but also the opportunities that they offer.
The current political economic context certainly poses a number of 
challenges which limit the representatives’ political leverage. Enforcement is 
often unreliable and inconsistent, and workers and unions are preoccupied with 
job security and concessions in the face of globalization, outsourcing and rapid 
technological change (Guadalupe, 2003; Quinlan, 1999; Quinlan, Mayhew 
and Bohle, 2001). Most representatives in this study insisted that they had a 
lot of support from their unions and their fellow workers, but it took very little 
probing to discover that they also often had problems mobilizing support for 
larger scale health and safety issues as priorities. Yet the KA representatives 
were able to gain some leverage in this context by using the same tools that 
management has traditionally used to control and limit labour’s demands for 
change—that is, research, information, analysis, and communication.
In our view, there are a number of developments in Ontario which 
have enhanced the opportunities and potential for knowledge activism. 
Provincial reforms to health and safety legislation during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s addressed access to hazardous information (WHMIS, 
1987), provided funding for more worker and representative training, 
and established a network of worker health and safety clinics. Legislative 
improvements in procedures and other requirements for health and safety 
committees such as requiring more rigorous reporting and record-keeping, 
were also important changes, along with increased penalties for non-
compliance and reporting requirements which extended the corporate and 
executive liability. As measured by inspections, orders issued, prosecutions 
and fine levels, enforcement also improved through the 1990s (Tucker, 
2003). These reforms did not greatly enhance the direct formal powers 
of worker representatives or joint committees, but in our view, they did 
encourage a deeper institutionalization of health and safety committees and 
representation at the workplace level, which heightened the status of the 
committees and their members, and fuelled a management integration of 
health and safety committees and issues into their management structures 
(e.g., see Geldart, Shannon and Lohfield, 2005).
The reforms also helped to create a significant network of health and 
safety training programs, union departments and experts, and independent 
agencies which offer representatives a better understanding of and access to 
scientific and technical knowledge. In recognizing the role of information 
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access, we would be remiss if we didn’t also recognize the potential 
significance of e-mail and web based technologies (Carroll and Hackett, 
2006; Pickard, 2006). We suggest that it is no coincidence that most of the 
knowledge activists were making frequent and extensive use of the e-mail 
to seek advice and the web to collect hazard related research information, 
engineering specifications, and equipment options and pricing.
Other factors may also be important in creating and shaping these 
political spaces and opportunities for knowledge activists, including changes 
in management ideologies and practices. For example, the development 
and spread of an audit corporate culture, in the auto industry in particular 
(Bandyopadhyay, 2005; Lin and Wu, 2005), may have had quite a profound 
effect on how companies approach health and safety management and 
health and safety committees. In emphasizing data-based decisions which 
often rely on worker and worker representative inputs, and by making more 
explicit the connections between production, cost, quality, and accidents 
(Zutshi and Sohal, 2005), audit programs such as the ISO 9000 and 14000 
series may have further enhanced the significance of health and safety issues 
and decisions in management planning.
We recognize that the potential for the technical-legal form of 
representation can also be enhanced by some of these same developments. 
The broader effort by management to bureaucratize and professionalize 
health and safety may encourage a depoliticized understanding of the 
representative’s role as a junior member of the management “team,” while 
continuing to empower management experts over workers. Explanations 
for how and why representatives adopt or resist different modes of 
representation within these contexts are beyond the terms of this study, but 
we wonder, with reference to future research, about differences between 
companies and unions, and the role they play. It may be that the significant 
number of knowledge activists in this study is at least partly a function of 
the fact that we only examined CAW workplaces, given that CAW has one 
of more extensive union training and education programs in North America, 
and is generally more critical in how it approaches participative management 
approaches to health and safety and labour relations (CAW, 1997; Walker, 
1997; Yates, 1993). Along similar lines, we also suspect that knowledge 
activism is more likely where collective bargaining agreements and human 
resource departments and policies are better developed (Walters, 1996a). 
Of course, this also raises the question of whether knowledge activism can 
readily develop in workplace settings where workers have no collective 
bargaining protections and security (Haynes, Boxall and Macky, 2005).1
1. We are currently conducting a case study of a non-union plant that may help to provide some 
further insights on this point. For a preliminary report on this work, see Hall et al. (2005).
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In the final analysis, a clearer picture of the workplace conditions that 
encourage or discourage the development of knowledge activism will require 
more research. We acknowledge that this study is limited both by its sample 
size and its reliance on unionized worker representatives. Our findings may 
also not generalize across other national and industrial contexts, although we 
suspect they will, given the many similar legislative, technical and corporate 
conditions in other jurisdictions (Saksvik and Quinlan, 2003; Walters, 
1996c). Further research is also needed to confirm the existence of the 
different forms of representation identified here and the claim that they have 
different impacts on working conditions. Still, mirroring the suggestions of 
Rosskam (2001) and others (Walters, 1996c), we suggest tentatively that 
unions should begin to discuss ways of developing collective bargaining, 
networking and training mechanisms that provide worker representatives 
with the resources, skills, and frameworks that encourage both a political 
orientation and a knowledge activist capacity.
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RÉSUMÉ
L’activisme de la connaissance et la représentation des 
travailleurs sur les comités de santé et de sécurité au travail
Cet essai signale des occasions qui se présentent aux représentants 
syndicaux en matière de santé et de sécurité au travail d’améliorer leurs 
conditions de travail au sein du climat économico-politique actuel. Nous 
sommes d’accord avec ceux qui voudraient une meilleure protection 
étatique des droits des travailleurs, mais qui sont bien conscients que des 
changements de cette envergure sont peu probables dans le contexte de 
néo-libéralisme et de mondialisation actuel. Dans la même foulée, notre 
objectif consiste à identifier et à étudier des situations dans lesquelles 
les représentants des travailleurs et les comités mixtes ont pu réaliser 
des améliorations significatives des conditions de travail en dépit des 
limitations et des contraintes apparemment insurmontables. Notre but est 
donc de chercher à savoir pourquoi et comment quelques représentants 
des travailleurs ont réussi à apporter des améliorations significatives aux 
conditions de travail, alors que d’autres ont moins bien réussi.
Le cadre théorique se situe dans la perspective de la « politique de 
production », c’est-à-dire que nous étudions le recours stratégique aux 
appareils politiques de production par les parties dans la relation d’emploi 
(Burawoy, 1985; Russell, 1999; Walters, 1985). De nombreux chercheurs 
ont identifié les paramètres de l’efficacité des comités mixtes et de la 
représentativité des travailleurs, peu cependant ont analysé les façons 
concrètes dont les changements surviennent dans un contexte de production 
et de comités mixtes. Pour ce faire, nous étudions les politiques et les 
stratégies que mettent de l’avant les représentants syndicaux pour améliorer 
les conditions de travail, en tenant compte de la dynamique du pouvoir à 
laquelle ils font face sur le plancher de l’usine.
Nos données proviennent d’entrevues qualitatives menées auprès des 
représentants de travailleurs syndiqués dans vingt-sept usines de pièces 
d’automobiles de taille petite à moyenne (50–500 employés) et dans 
quatre usines d’assemblage de taille plus grande. Toutes les usines de notre 
échantillon étaient représentées par des sections locales des Travailleurs 
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canadiens de l’automobile en Ontario et toutes les personnes interviewées 
avaient suivi une formation syndicale en santé et sécurité au travail. De 
plus, la plupart avaient bénéficié d’une formation additionnelle conçue pour 
des représentants désignés et certifiés sur les lieux de travail. Nous avons 
demandé aux participants de décrire comment ils identifiaient des enjeux 
en matière de santé et de sécurité, comment ils abordaient ces enjeux et 
ce qu’ils pensaient être en mesure d’instaurer à titre de changements. En 
posant ces questions, nous voulions comprendre les méthodes, les stratégies 
et les tactiques que les représentants des travailleurs identifiaient comme 
des approches propices aux changements. Les entrevues étaient semi-
structurées, enregistrées sur bande et transcrites.
En nous basant sur ces données, nous avons conclu que certains 
représentants étaient plus efficaces que d’autres sur trois dimensions : 1) une 
préoccupation à l’endroit d’enjeux visibles et imminents en sécurité versus 
une attention plus large aux enjeux liés à la sécurité et à la santé au travail; 
2) une attention centrée sur des enjeux de moindre importance ayant des 
effets limités sur la production ou les coûts versus des interventions à grande 
échelle, marquées par des différences au plan des coûts, du temps exigé 
pour effectuer des changements, un besoin de modifications d’ingénierie, 
ou bien une reconfiguration du processus de production; 3) enfin, un accent 
sur les enjeux de surface ou de conséquences au lieu de la recherche de 
causes fondamentales sous-jacentes. Les perceptions que les interviewés 
se faisaient de leur degré de succès nous informaient sur leur position dans 
l’échelle mais ne la déterminaient pas.
Notre distinction initiale entre les enjeux, les stratégies et les résultats 
nous a révélé la présence de deux grands types de représentation dans le 
domaine de la santé et de la sécurité : une représentation d’ordre juridique 
et technique (N = 10) et une autre que nous qualifions d’activisme politique 
(N = 20). Elles étaient détectables par le recours chez le premier type aux 
règles et aux procédures établies servant à identifier les dangers et, chez 
le second, par la volonté de questionner les exigences et les contraintes 
imposées par la direction. Cependant, au sein de ce dernier groupe, 
nous avons détecté un sous-groupe plus efficace dont l’engagement 
politique impliquait la collecte stratégique, l’emploi et le déploiement de 
connaissances. En les comparant à leurs collègues moins efficaces, les 
activistes maniant les connaissances (N = 11) étaient plus susceptibles de 
recueillir leur propre information, de faire valoir la connaissance qu’ont 
les travailleurs des conditions dangereuses, de mobiliser les collègues en 
vue d’appuyer leurs demandes de corrections et de proposer des solutions 
de rechange. Ils s’avéraient aussi de meilleurs agents de changement que 
les représentants du groupe des activistes ou du groupe du type technique-
juridique.
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Le contrôle des connaissances constituait le noyau de l’activisme 
de ces représentants et était la raison première de leur degré plus élevé
de succès. Ils se rendaient compte que, comme travailleurs, ils avaient besoin 
de démontrer leur compétence en « faisant figure de ceux qui savent », ce 
qu’ils faisaient en identifiant et en documentant les dangers, recueillant 
de l’information chez des sources médicales et scientifiques, ou bien en 
recourant à des experts indépendants. Les activistes de la connaissance 
étaient remarquables par leur capacité de contestation par la persuasion et 
l’argumentation. Tout en ne fuyant pas les tactiques politiques ouvertes 
telle que la mobilisation des travailleurs pour se plaindre et refuser le 
travail dangereux, ou bien le recours à des inspecteurs du gouvernement, 
ils utilisaient ces instruments de façon sporadique et seulement en ajout à 
des cas bien argumentés et appuyés, portés à l’attention de la direction aussi 
bien au sein des comités mixtes qu’à l’extérieur. La reconnaissance par la 
direction que ces représentants pouvaient recourir à la pression de nature 
politique au besoin pouvait aider à expliquer la volonté de la compagnie 
d’écouter et d’agir en se fondant seulement sur la persuasion, mais il 
devenait aussi évident en se fiant aux comptes-rendus des représentants 
que ces derniers pouvaient voir la puissance légale et scientifique de leurs 
arguments comme une partie intégrale de leur capacité d’obtenir, même 
face au travailleur moyen, l’appui du syndicat ou de l’État.
Nous avons conceptualisé l’activisme de la connaissance comme une 
réponse évolutive aux conditions contraignantes auxquelles font face les 
représentants dans leurs efforts en vue d’apporter des changements. En 
d’autres termes, à l’intérieur de notre cadre de référence, l’activisme de la 
connaissance se visualise mieux quand il est conçu comme une adaptation 
du travailleur, balisée par les contraintes et les occasions enchâssées 
dans le contexte politique et économique actuel. Plus précisément, nous 
reconnaissons les limites des pouvoirs des comités reconnus par la loi et 
l’effet négatif de l’absence de sécurité d’emploi, mais nous soulignons 
aussi qu’il s’est produit un certain nombre de changements positifs, tels que 
de meilleurs réseaux de formation et l’accès à l’information en ligne qui 
sont venus améliorer la connaissance des travailleurs et faciliter l’accès à 
l’information. De plus, nous voyons certaines réformes dans la législation et 
son application, en plus des développements dans la gestion des entreprises 
comme facteurs pouvant bonifier la capacité d’un représentant d’utiliser 
ses connaissances et cette information d’une manière plus efficace. Nous 
soutenons que l’activisme de la connaissance peut être une réponse 
stratégique devant être encouragée et apprise et, dans la même foulée, 
nous signalons le besoin de développer des mécanismes syndicaux en vue 
d’appuyer cette forme de représentation.
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